In Zaldivar v. Prickett, decided July 6, 2015, the Georgia Supreme Court appears to have answered the question of whether a jury should be allowed to apportion fault at trial against a plaintiff’s employer, even though the employer would have immunity or other liability defenses which would have prevented the plaintiff from suing the employer directly.
Daniel Prickett sued Imelda Zaldivar to recover damages for injuries Prickett allegedly sustained in a car wreck. Prickett and Zaldivar each blamed the other for the collision and Zaldivar filed a Notice of Non-Party Fault as to Overhead Door Company, Prickett’s employer at the time of the collision. Prickett was driving a truck that Overhead door had provided to him in connection with his employment. According to Zaldivar, Overhead Door was negligent in entrusting Prickett with a company truck and, for that reason, it should bear some of the responsibility for any injuries that he sustained.
Prickett argued that the Georgia Apportionment Statute, O.C.G.A § 51-12-33, should not apply to Overhead Door and Overhead Door should not be named as a non-party at fault because Prickett could not have sued Overhead Door for negligently entrusting the company vehicle to himself. The Court of Appeals agreed and found that Overhead Door should not be placed on the verdict form. The Supreme Court has now overruled the Court of Appeals on this issue.
In a lengthy opinion authored by Justice Blackwell, the Supreme Court discusses in detail the definitions of “fault” under the Apportionment Statute. According to the Supreme Court, the Apportionment Statute requires the trier of fact to consider the fault of a non-party only when the non-party is shown to have committed a tort against the plaintiff that was a proximate cause of his injury. Because negligent entrustment of a vehicle can be a proximate cause of an injury to the person to whom the vehicle was entrusted, Overhead Door should have been on the verdict form.
The fact that Overhead Door likely could not have been sued by its own employee for entrusting a vehicle to him (primarily because the driver would be, most likely, predominantly at fault in any such incident) does not prevent the employer as being named as a non-party at fault under the Apportionment Statute. The Supreme Court went on to discuss the fact that even if an entity is immune from suit for some other reason, that reason, whatever it is, would not prohibit the person or entity from being considered a “tortfeasor” or “party at fault.”
This analysis is important in one of the most common arguments regarding the Apportionment Statute: whether an employer who has statutory immunity pursuant to the Workers Compensation Act can be listed on the verdict form as a party at fault. I believe Zaldivar answers that question in the affirmative. There is very little argument left that an employer should not be allowed on a verdict form simply because it has statutory immunity (it still has to be proven that the employer was negligent and that its negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries). This issue should be definitively decided this term in another case my partner Matt Moffett has in front of the Supreme Court which presents that exact question. We expect the Court in that case to find that it has already addressed the issue in Zaldivar.
Please let me know if you would like a copy of the opinion.
The Georgia Supreme Court recently issued an opinion which clarifies how trial courts should calculate the amount of attorney fees owed to a plaintiff after an offer of settlement has been rejected. The case is Georgia Dept. of Corrections v. Couch.
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68, commonly referred to as the “offer of settlement” statute, provides for attorney’s fees to parties whose settlement offers are rejected. When a defendant makes an offer to settle pursuant to the statute which is then rejected by the plaintiff, the defendant can recover attorney fees from the date of rejection if the verdict obtained by the plaintiff is less than 75% of the offer. For example, if a defendant offers to settle the case for $100,000, then the plaintiff must obtain a verdict of at least $75,000 to avoid paying the defendant’s attorney’s fees. Conversely, a plaintiff may also take advantage of the offer of settlement statute and recover attorney fees if the verdict amounts to more than 125% of the rejected offer amount. Using the previous example, if a plaintiff’s offer to settle the case for $100,000 is rejected, then the plaintiff can recover its attorney’s fees with a verdict of more than $125,000.
A defendant’s attorney’s fees are easily calculated, as defense attorneys are typically paid by an hourly rate. However, a plaintiff’s attorney is usually paid on a contingency arrangement, meaning the attorney receives an agreed-upon percentage of the amount recovered at trial as the fee. Until the decision in Couch, it was unclear how the trial court should calculate attorney fees for a plaintiff whose offer pursuant to the statute was rejected.
In Couch, the plaintiff was entitled to attorney’s fees after the jury returned a verdict greater than 125% of his prior settlement offer. The trial court determined that the fees should be awarded based on the contingency fee agreement between Couch and his attorneys – 40% of Couch’s ultimate recovery.
Instead, the Supreme Court found that the award of attorney fees could not be based solely on the contingency fee agreement. Rather, the trial court should have considered evidence of the reasonable value of the work Couch’s attorneys performed, such as evidence of the amount of hours worked and testimony regarding the hourly rate for attorneys with similar experience.
More importantly, the Supreme Court held that Couch was not entitled to recover all of his attorney fees – only the amount of fees incurred from the date of the rejection of the offer through the entry of judgment. This decision is particularly helpful for defendants. Defendants facing a potential attorney fees award for a rejected settlement offer will not necessarily be bound by the contingency agreement between the plaintiff and the attorney. Defendants also will not be responsible for all of the plaintiff’s attorney fees incurred from the very beginning of the case.
If you have any questions or would like a copy of this opinion, please let us know.
On Monday April 7, 2014 Judge Thomas Thrash of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia ruled in favor of our client, National Casualty Company (“National Casualty”) in a declaratory judgment action arising out of extreme claims of teacher abuse. David Sawyer and I represent National Casualty. National Casualty Company v. Melanie Pickens, et al.
RP was a student at Hopewell Middle School in Atlanta from 2004-2007. She had been diagnosed with Down syndrome and suffered from other medical ailments. Melanie Pickens was her special education teacher. RP and her parents filed suit against Pickens asserting various state law claims and civil rights violations and alleged that Pickens had committed multiple shocking and offensive acts, such as:
- Screaming at RP and the other children on a daily basis;
- Burping in the faces of RP and the other children;
- Shaking her breasts and pressing them on the faces of RP and the other children;
- Pressing her buttocks into the faces of the faces of RP and the other children and passing gas;
- Cursing at RP and the other children;
- Often using vulgarities in front of RP and the other children;
- Spraying RP with Lysol and putting her out in the hallway after RP passed gas in class.
RP alleged that those acts were committed “with deliberate indifference towards the rights of [RP] and with specific intent to injure her.”
National Casualty was an insurer for the Professional Association for Georgia Educators and defended this lawsuit under a reservation of rights. We filed a declaratory judgment action on behalf of National Casualty seeking a ruling that, based upon the allegations of the complaint, there was no requirement that National Casualty defend or indemnify Ms. Pickens. Specifically, three exclusions in the insurance contract relieve National Casualty from any liability: the intentional acts exclusion, the criminal acts exclusion, and the sexual misconduct exclusion. Ms. Pickens did not answer the Complaint. RP opposed our motion for summary judgment on the coverage issues.
Judge Thrash restated the general principles of Georgia law which provide that an insurer’s duty to defend turns on the language of the insurance contract and the allegations of the complaint asserted against the insured. “Although the provisions of an insurance policy will be construed against the insurer when a part is susceptible of two constructions . . . if the language is unambiguous and but one reasonable construction is possible, the Court will enforce the contract as written. To excuse the duty to defend, the [lawsuit] must unambiguously exclude coverage under the policy . . . and thus, the duty to defend exists if the claim potentially comes within the policy.”
Judge Thrash found that the “intentional acts” exclusion of National Casualty policy relieved it of liability for all of the acts alleged by RP. The acts which gave rise to RP’s lawsuit were deliberate. Even though RP also asserted a negligence claim against Pickens, Judge Thrash held this claim nonetheless arose from Pickens intentional acts.
RP argued, among other things, that the criminal acts exclusion of the policy does not apply because Pickens was found to be immune from criminal liability. Even if this were true, according to Judge Thrash, the intentional acts exclusion still relieved National Casualty of any liability in connection with RP’s lawsuit. Therefore, National Casualty had no duty to defend Pickens and no duty to indemnify her for any liability that may arise from RP’s lawsuit.
We expect this ruling to be appealed to the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals. Please let me know if you would like a copy of the opinion.
The Georgia Court of Appeals recently issued a decision which clarifies the amount of evidence needed for juries to consider the fault of someone who is not a party to the lawsuit. Through a pleading known as a notice of non-party fault, a defendant can ask the jury to apportion a percentage of fault to a non-party. Until the Double View Ventures, LLC v. Polite decision issued on March 26, 2014, it was not clear how much evidence of the non-party’s fault was required in order to put that non-party on the verdict form.
On March 27, 2014 the Georgia Court of Appeals ruled for our client, RFM Development Company (“RFM”), in a lawsuit in which the Plaintiff was severely injured when he fell through an uncovered hole on a construction site where he was working. Seimer et al vs. RFM Development Co. et al. Nicole Leet and I represent RFM and were successful in obtaining summary judgment in the State Court of Cobb County on behalf of RFM. The Plaintiff appealed and the Court of Appeals agreed that summary judgment for RFM was appropriate.
Plaintiff Steve Pickelsimer was a temporary worker employed by Bradford Building Company (“Bradford”), a general contractor building a Walgreens Pharmacy in a shopping center being developed by RFM (the property was owned by our client and co-defendant RFM Bremen, LLC which also was granted summary judgment). RFM hired Bradford and signed a standard American Institute of Archictects (AIA) contract which contained general provisions regarding the owner’s right to stop work. The same contract indicated that Bradford would be solely responsible for, and have control over, construction means, methods, techniques, etc. Bradford was tasked with maintaining and supervising all safety precautions and programs in connection with the performance of the work. Under the contract, Bradford was required to take reasonable precautions for the safety of employees on the worksite. In his deposition, the president of RFM testified that RFM had the right to “direct” the work but that Bradford controlled it. He stated “we paid for it, but we didn’t control it.”
Mr. Pickelsimer was injured in August of 2008 when he stepped through a hole which was usually covered with an unsecured, unmarked forty pound piece of plywood. Mr. Pickelsimer fell twenty-five feet suffering a brain injury. He had no recollection of the accident or the events leading up to it.
In his lawsuit against RFM, Plaintiff contended that by contract RFM had retained sufficient control over the property so as to make it liable for this injury. The trial court found that summary judgment was appropriate because undisputed evidence, including the contract, showed that RFM had not retained any control over Bradford’s method of work; RFM had not expressly assumed responsibility for compliance with OSHA regulations; and RFM was not a “controlling employer” for purposes of the so called “multi-employer doctrine.”
The Court of Appeals agreed, finding that a property owner who surrenders possession and control of its property to an independent contractor generally is not liable for injuries sustained by the contractor’s employees on the property due to unsafe conditions. The Court of
Appeals ruled that RFM did not retain the right to direct the time, manner, methods and means of execution of the work but only contractually retained the right to insist that Bradford perform the work pursuant to the contract. Nothing in the AIA contract relied on by the Plaintiff created sufficient “control” over the work on behalf of RFM. Undisputed evidence showed that the RFM officer supervising the progress of the construction project stopped by the site infrequently and usually did not even get out of his car. Even if RFM retained the right to enter the premises for the limited purpose of checking on the progress of the work, RFM did not retain the right of supervision and Bradford was entirely free to do the work in its own way.
As to Plaintiffs argument that OSHA’s multi-employer doctrine applied and RFM was a “controlling employer” the Court of Appeals found that the Plaintiff had not provided sufficient legal argument on this issue. Although not cited by the Court of Appeals, we retained a former OSHA director as an expert who testified that RFM was not, in fact, a “controlling employer” and the multi-employer doctrine did not apply.
Please let us know if you would like a copy of this opinion.
On February 24, 2014 in Ford Motor Co. v. Conley the Georgia Supreme Court ruled that Plaintiffs who filed a product liability lawsuit against Ford were entitled to a new trial even though a jury had found in favor of Ford and the Plaintiffs had not appealed the verdict. Ford will be faced with a retrial because it failed to disclose all available insurance coverage for jury selection and represented to the Court and the Plaintiff that it was “self-insured.”
Jordan and Renee Conley filed a product liability lawsuit against Ford in the State Court of Cobb County based on a rollover accident that occurred in April of 2006. After nearly two years of pretrial discovery the case went to trial in November of 2009. The jury, which was not qualified as to relationships with any of Ford’s insurers, returned a verdict in favor of Ford on November 19, 2009. The trial court entered judgment on the verdict in late November 2009 and the Conleys did not appeal.
Recently, Chris Ziegler, Debbie Haan, and I successfully represented our client, the owner of a building in DeKalb County, in a lawsuit brought by a former tenant who claimed that roof leaks had substantially damaged its property and cost it millions of dollars in lost business. At the close of discovery, we filed a motion to dismiss the Plaintiff’s complaint for withholding relevant documents until the very end of discovery and violation of a prior Order from the court. After several hearings, Judge Stacey Hydrick of the State Court of DeKalb County granted our motion and dismissed the Complaint with prejudice. She subsequently also awarded our client attorneys’ fees and expenses in the amount of $37,000.
On November 22, 2013, in MCG Health, Inc. v. Kight the Georgia Court of Appeals established that a hospital may assert a lien in a personal injury case for amounts over and above what it receives from the health insurer for the personal injury plaintiff even if the health insurer has a contract with the hospital indicating that the amounts paid by the insurer represents “payment in full.”
MCG Health, Inc. operates MCG Medical Center (“MCG”). Kight was a passenger in a car driven by an allegedly intoxicated driver (the tortfeasor) and MCG furnished care to Kight pursuant to a contract with Kight’s managed health care insurer, Blue Cross/Blue Shield (Blue Cross). The contract between MCG and Blue Cross provided that MCG agreed to discount its billed charges for covered hospital care and accept the discounted amount as “payment in full” for the covered care provided to Blue Cross members such as Kight. The contract allowed MCG to bill Kight directly for deductibles and co-pays but MCG agreed under the contract not to balance-bill for the difference between MCG’s billed charges and the discounted amount due under the contract.
Recently, the Georgia Court of Appeals again faced the question of whether claims of common law contribution and indemnity are still viable under Georgia law and has decided that, in cases where liability is going to be apportioned, they are not.
The opinion of District Owners Assoc., Inc. v. AMEC Environmental & Infrastructure, Inc. arose out of a premises liability lawsuit brought by Richard Corbett. On January 18, 2010, Mr. Corbett was jogging on a sidewalk through Atlantic Station in Atlanta, Georgia. On the other side of the wall next to the sidewalk was a parking deck. Mr. Corbett believed he could jump over this wall to continue jogging through the parking deck. Unfortunately, Mr. Corbett did not realize until after he jumped over the wall that there was a 30 foot drop-off to the ground floor of the parking deck. Having suffered serious injuries from the fall, Mr. Corbett filed suit against the property owner, District Owners Association, and the management company.